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Abstract. Proven secure signature schemes and unconditionally secure
authentication schemes with arbiter have been proposed. The former are
not practical (too slow) and the latter cannot be reused. All these limitations are solved in this paper by presenting a resuable conditionally
secure authentication scheme with arbiter. The scheme is unconditionally secure against denial by the sender of having sent a message (which
signatures do not have) and conditionally secure against a receiver impersonating the sender or substituting a message and conditionally secure
against a similar fraud by the arbiter.
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Introduction

One can make a proven secure signature scheme [9, 11] based on anyone way
function. Unfortunately all proven secure signature schemes [7, 9, 1, 11, 2] are
very impractical (to make some of them more practical the authentication tree
could be used instead of pseudo random functions but this approach requires
a lot of memory). So from a practical viewpoint it could be advantageous to
use symmetric authentication schemes, however one then loses the signature
property. In the classical notion of arbiter [8, p. 409] the arbiter has to be active
when messages are transmitted.
Simmons [14] introduced unconditionally secure authentication schemes with
arbitration. From a functional viewpoint the arbiter is not active, in Simmons'
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scheme, during the transmission of the authenticated message while in the classical notion the arbiter must be active. Desmedt and Yung [6] (see also Brickell
and Stinson [4]) improved Simmons' scheme by protecting the receiver against
an impersonation (substitution) attack by the arbiter. Unfortunately a.ll these
schemes can only be used once (because otherwise they lose their security) and
hence new keys have to be distributed for each new message as in a one time
pad.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a practical proven secure conditional
authentication scheme with arbitration. Our scheme has some similarities with
[10], however our scheme is non-interactive and the keys can be re-used.

2

Definitions

Let us call S the sender, R the receiver, A the arbiter, and 0 the outside opponent. We can distinguish three stages in Simmons' solution [141. The three
stages are:
The key initialization phase in which S, R and A interact to come up with
the necessary keys.
The authentication phase in which R receives a message and wants to ascertain that the message is authentic. A does not interact in this stage.
The dispute phase in which A is requested to resolve a dispute between Sand
R. Using some information gathered by A during the initialization phase A
solves the dispute.
Our scheme contains these three stages as well.
Let us describe more precisely the threats with which we are faced. We follow
closely Simmons's description of such threats (for the first three threats see [14]).
The outside opponent. The outsider, 0, can try to impersonate the sender
and/or substitute some message(s) for one sent from S to R, but which 0
has intercepted (actively eavesdropped).
The attack is said to be successful if and only if R accepts the message as
authentic when it is not.
The sender. A dishonest S can attempt to cheat by sending a message which
R will accept as authentic, but which he can later deny having sent.
The attack is successful if and only if the following two conditions hold.
First, R accepts the fraudulent message, and second, in a dispute A will
decide that the message is not authentic.
The receiver. A dishonest R can falsely claim to have received the message M
from S. Two sub cases can be distinguished: R never received a message at
all, or R has received some authentic message(s) from S which he tries to
alter.
The attack is successful if and only if in a dispute A certifies the message as
being authentic.
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The arbiter. A dishonest A can send a message to R which R will accept as
authentic. As in the case of the opponent's attack the arbiter can either
choose an impersonation or a substitution attack.
The attack is successful if and only if the message originating at A will be
accepted by R.
We remark that it is not A's task to force R to accept messages originating from

S.
The reader who is interested in formalizing the above informal definitions is
referred to [6]. Although these definitions have been given for unconditionally
secure schemes, they can very easily be adapted for conditionally secure ones.

3 . The Scheme
We use S for the sender, R for the receiver and A for the arbiter. We assume
the existence of a conditionally proven secure authentication scheme. When we
mention keys we assume that these (symmetric) keys were chosen according to
a prescribed algorithm and belong to the set K.
3.1

Distribution Phase

Step 1 A sends S an ordered tuple (kl' k2 , ••• , kn ) of random, independently
chosen, keys privately.
Step 2 A chooses with uniform probability distribution a random subset, I,
of l n/2J indices between 1 and n and privately sends to R the tuple
(k~, k~, ... , k~) where k~ = k, if i E I, otherwise ki = f, where f ~ K,
(for example ( may be the empty string).
Step 3 S privately sends a key, kn+!' to R.
3.2

Authentication Phase

To send a message M the sender S forms n + 1 message authentication codes
(M ACs) by processing the message with each of the n + 1 keys, n provided by
the arbiter and one by himself, using a proven secure authentication scheme. Call
these MAGs MAG1,MAG2, ... , MAGn+!. The sender sends (M, MAGI, MAG2,
... , M AGn+d where MAGi is generated using the key k i , the message M and
the agreed authentication algorithm to R.
To verify whether R should accept M as (probably) being authentic R proceeds as follows: if k: :f. f then R checks that M ACi is correct, and does this
for all i, 1 $ i $ n, and additionally checks if M ACn +l also matches. If these
l n/2J + 1 MAGs are correct R accepts M as authentic, otherwise R rejects. In
the case R rejects R erases his keys and requests new keys unless all the MAGs
were wrong.
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3.3

Dispute Phase

If a dispute occurs the receiver presents (M, M ACt, M AC2 , ••• ', M ACn ) to the
arbiter. The arbiter will accept the message plus the M ACs as correct if among
(M,M ACt,M AC2,"" MACn ) all those M ACs that R should have known were
correct are indeed correct plus at least one more MAC is correct.
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Proof of Security

We will use h as a security parameter so that the complexity of performing an
attack on the underlying authentication scheme is bounded above by l/p(h)
where p is any polynomial. We assume 5 receives feedback from R whether he
has accepted the message M or not.
Theorem 1. Let n in our scheme be chosen linear in h the security parameter. Now if a conditionally proven secure authentication scheme exists then
our scheme is secure against a denial attack by the sender, conditionally secure
against an attack in which the receiver, the arbiter or an outsider attempts to
modify the message or impersonate the sender.
Proof. The receiver's attack will not succeed as he does not know enough keys
and the authentication scheme was assumed to be secure. A similar proof holds
for the arbiter's and an outsider's attacks. We now consider denial by the sender.
We do not consider M ACn +t as this was used only to protect against the arbiter.
If the sender wishes to have a false message accepted and then deny sending
the message he optimizes his chance of winning by adopting a game plan. He
wants R to accept and A to reject. Now if 5 has sent i {i : 0, ... , len - 2)/2j}
correct M ACs and n - i incorrect M ACs then R will reject the message and so
5 loses. If 5 sends i {i : Len + 2)/2J , ... , n} correct M ACs and n - i incorrect
M ACs then if R accepts the message as genuine then so will A and again 5
loses. If 5 sends l n/2J correct M ACs and n - ln/2J incorrect M ACs, then 5
can win if he has chosen exactly the ln/2J M ACs that R has, R will accept but
the arbiter will reject. There are exactly

ways of choosing subsets of the indices of the M ACs with ln/2J elements.
Our assumption that 5 receives feedback from R whether a message M was
accepted or not implies 5 can win next time if he guesses all the indices of the
. keys, kj = f, and sends the MACis of these n - In/2J keys correctly and all
other M ACs incorrectly. In this case R will reject the message but not erase his
keys (so R will not ask for new keys). The probability of this suc~eeding without
detection is also

1
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So the probability is negligible of an attack succeeding (even if repeated 3
polynomially many times).
0
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Conclusions

We have presented an authentication scheme with arbiter which is unconditionally secure against denial by the sender of having sent a message and conditionally secure against a receiver impersonating the sender or substituting a message
and conditionally secure against a similar fraud by the arbiter.
The security obtained is the same as for the symmetric authentication scheme
on which it is based. We observe that making practical proven secure authentication schemes is easy to achieve starting from pseudo-noise generators [12, 13]
and unconditionally secure authentication schemes [5].
It is clear that the scheme presented in Section 3, can be adapted for DES.
We remind the reader that DES is not a proven secure scheme and that some
weaknesses have been found in the protocol for generating M ACs [3].
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